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Abstract 
Huch recent resenrch in the area of judgment and decision making 
has been dominatfcd by documentation of ways in which people's intuitive 
thought processes can lead them astray. Like other psychological 
results that have cast doubt on people's abilities, these accounts have 
generated considerable controversy. From the set of criticisms that 
have been raised, a set of generic criticisms that could be raised is 
dt,veloped here. These include aspersions of methodological malpractice, 
advancement of alternative standards of optimality, and development of 
error theories showing the insensitivity of events to these kinds of 
problems. Considering these critici.sms in general form offers some 
perspectives on the continuing debate, some guidance on how to improve 
its productivity, and some hypotheses for analyzing analogous 
controversies elsewhere in psychology. 
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Prejudices About Bias 
A cynical view of psychologists holds that they r.iake their living 
observing quirks in other people's behavior. One good quirk, docunented 
through half a do~en articles, is enough to secure tenure in most 
depart-ments. ' One rnegaquirk, a la Frt'l1d, may secun0 a lifelong (or 
longer) reputation. 
Although they may be a road to success, quirks are also a road to 
controversy. Claims about newly discovered human foibles seem more 
likely to be argued about than, say, fresh estimates of a particular 
choice reaction time, threshold of perception, or digit span. Not only 
do more people feel that they need to express an opinion about the work, 
but the tenor of those opinions is more likely to become strident than 
with non-quirk claims making equally fundanental statements about human 
behavior. 
It wou1d take a psychologist to provide a full account of why 
people worry so about quirks. However, a number of eecurrent themes can 
be identified. Cons1dering them in advance allows those about to claim 
the existence of a new quirk to anticipate the standard counterclaims, 
whether to buttress their own findings or to prepare the standard rebut-
tals. Consi.dering these themes in the heat of a debate ccrn help sharpen 
the d.iscussion, s,wing participants the exercise in lay philosophy 
needed to cast it in generic terms. Considering the themes in retro--
spect may indicate what chancEi fl debate. had of being resolved (given the 
nature of the clA.ims and counterclaims), whether sone key concepts or 
studies mi.ght have speeded its resolution, il.nd whers' tlw unregolved 
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conflict has gone. 
These themes are discussed here in tt>rms of their emergence in the 
controversy surrounding the research into judgmental biases associated 
with Kahneman, Tversky, and their colleagues (or apologists, or fellow 
travelers, dt~pending on one's prejudices about these biases). 1 Analo-
gous developm0nts might be found i.u the controversies over Freud's 
claims of psychodynm,1ic distort.ions, Piaget's descripti.ons of children's 
cognitive limitattons, Kuhn's char.acteri?,ations of the built-in 
incapacities that come with sociali?.ation in a science, as well as other 
less sensational episodes. 
For readers unfamiliar with this research, Table 1 sunmiarizes some 
of the biases or quirks that investigators in this tradition clai.m to 
have ident.ified, along with some pertinent references. The biases are 
seen as the byproducts of widely used rules of thumb, or he_uristics, 
that people use to direct their judgments under conditions of i:mcer-
tainty~ These rules hcwe some natural appeal and can, at times, be 
helpful. However, they can also lead to predictable problems when used 
alone or without qualification. For example, recalling instances of an 
r:~vent occurring can provide a clue to its frequency (the availability 
heuristic), but may be misleading when 'Lts occurrence is unusually 
m0rnorable or forgettable~ 
Insert TAb.le l about here 
"It's Not True" 
Psychologists nre adept nt picking holes in the dc,sir;n and analysJ.s 
of research~ The .lonp; apprenticeship that confers thi.s ability ts 
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intended to help them secure the foundations of their own studies and 
ferret out the justifiable conclusions from studies conducted by uthers. 
Al though so@:.s picking is always in order, it can also be out of order, 
as when routine criticisms are used to avoid listening to results that 
one si1:1ply does not want to hear. Every colloquium audience has regu-
lars, ready with the same methodological critiques for ;,.11 comers. 
Where these standard questions remind investigators of alternativE:• ex-
planations, they serve a useful role. Where they coopelJ. discussion of 
controls that went without saying or potential effects of at best mini-
mal si?.e, then they are tedious. Where they probe at issues that can 
hardJ.y be answered within the context of the discipline (e.g., how do 
you know that your subjects really under.stood the task? How do you know 
that your subjects ,wren' t trying to make your hypothesis succeed--or 
fail?), then they can sti.tle constructive discussion. 
A limiting factor on most critiques, even obstructi.onist ones, is 
not threatening the shared assumptions of the discipline, those articles 
of faith without which any interpretation of data would be impossible~ 
For complete radical skepticism, an outsider is often needed. Thus, 
philosophers can offer (what psychologists might consider) outrageous 
alternative explf:l.nati.ons of what subjects might be thinking in a parti-
cuh1r experiment without feeltng any compulsion to test the viabil.ity of 
t:hat account for other experirrtf.mts i.n the same article, r.iuch less seek a 
.singh: explanation for the full body of evidet1ce. Or, sociologists can 
refuse to consider results that have not been obtained with proper 
probability SB.nples of p3.rti.c.i.pants. Or, economists can insist that the 
characteri?.ation of the task is incomplete until 'it includes what(~ver 
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factors subjects succeeded in optimi;,:ing by their behavior (which is 
held, by definition, to serve their best interests). 
The first of the six sections in Table 2 contains a set of techni-
cal questions commonly raised by those who accept the possibility of 
psychological research into human judgment. Eacl1 assumes that something 
is wrong with the particular procedures that have been used. The claim 
i.s that once these instances of methodological malpractice are re.nedied, 
the biases wil 1 vanish. For example, if the task is made neHlly impor-
tant to subjects, then they will Hpply themselves hard enough to get it 
right. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
It is a question of philosophy of science whether the burden of 
proof should lie more with the original investigator to refute these 
claims or with their proponents to e.stabli.sh the.:Lr validity. The burden 
probably shifts toward the latter when they argue not just that the 
original interpretation is not true, but that an alternative one is4 
Thus, it is one thing to claim that failure to provide high enough 
stakes vi.ti;Jtes a claim of apparently biased behttvior, and another tbing 
to substtmtiate the b.:<Lief that people perform well when they really 
c,.n:e about H task. 
Given the costs of conducting studies to ;.iddress every possible 
counterclaim, there j_s a temptation to meet skepticism w:i.th skepticism. 
One c.ommo:n expression of the refusal to respond to data.less crit.iques is 
arguing thll.t subjects really care 11bout well-staged experiFJE'nts that 
treB.t them respectfully~ Another is argu:Lng that experiments give 
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subjects a better deal than they are likely to get in life, where the 
analogous problems are typically buried in the confusion of everyday 
existence, without the opportunity to focus attention on them, to have 
them neatly circumscribed by the experimenter, and to be rewarded for 
good judgment (rather than, say, for exuding confidence). A complement 
of this argm:1ent is that it is hard to create extrinsic incentives that 
will have just the right effect: well-intended reward schemes may inad-
vertently induce irrelevant competition auong subjects, gaming between 
subject and experimenter, or behavior peculiar to some unexpected inter-
pretation of the particular payoff rule. 2 
Despite the fluency with which such conjecture-refutation inter-
changes can be conducted and the heat that they are able to generate, 
some data do get collected. One way to make the data go a little 
further, and obviate the need for conducting every methodological check 
on every extant result, .is to see whether any general statements can be 
made about the impact of various methodological controls~ A review of 
all published studies that could be construed as attempts to remedy 
flaws in tasks that allegedly re.vealed hindsight bias or overconfidence 
(Fischhoff, 1982a) found that none of the art if actual manipulations in 
Table 2 had produced consistent (or even any dernonstr<:ihle) improvements 
in performance. Tt is an empirical question whethe.r comparabl':' reviews 
o.f the evidence for other biases (or additional studies ot these two) 
will yield s:l.rnilar patterns of results. However, this review did offer 
some reassurance that apparent biases could not be account,~d for ( nor 
dismissed) quite so routinely~ Until further evidence is in, the jury 
must remain out on these questions, with f.ndst'i.ng evidence providing 
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some guidance for the judgment that must come in its stead. 
"It's True But You Shouldn't Say It" 
Ascript'ions of bins seem to be s,1ying something fundamental--and 
rather unflatter.ing--about people, namely, that they are not very good 
at consequential tasks. By implication, they also say something rather 
nice about the .investi.gators in this domain. Not only do they know the 
r.ight answers to questions where others stumble, but they are clever 
enough to design experiments illuminating those failures. For some 
observers, this .is not only a dangerous combination, but one with 
ramif.ications far beyond the tidy little world of psychologists and 
their .internecine struggles~ 
Quirks, in general, make good readi.ng, meaning that they have a 
reasonable chance of beirrg understood by the general publtc. These 
particular quirks regarding judgmental capabilities touch such an essen-
tial aspect of human affairs that it is likely to attract an audience 
having not only an interest, but a vested interest in their implica-
tions~ For example, the role afforded the public in managing hau1rdous 
technologies should depend, at least in part, on their ability to under-
stand the ~omplex and uncertain technical issues involved~ As a result, 
there are plenty of invol\Ted observers for whon "sd.entifi.c proof" of 
lay people's foibles would constitute either very good or very bad 
political news, depending upon whether they wisl, to promote programs 
such as right-to-know laws and dereg;ulation, which require, public under-
stand'ing, or consumer protection l11ws and deference to techn.Lcal eli..te.s, 
which come in lieu of broad-based understanding (Fischhoff, Slovic. and 
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Lichtenstein, 1982). 
Hore generally, any sweeping statements about human capabilities 
reflect on how we think about our fellows or ourselves (if we take the 
research personally). There is a sharp distinction between the i.mages 
expressed iu Shakespeare's: 
"What a piece of work is r:wn. 
How noble in reason, how infiuite in 
faculties, in form and noving how 
express and admirable, in action 
how like an angel. In apprehension how like 
a god. The beauty of the world, 
the paragon of animals." 
and Herbert Simon's: 
"The capacity of the human mind i:or 
formulating and solving complex problems is 
very small compared with the si?-e of the 
problems whose solution is required for 
objectively rational behavior in the real 
world--or even for a reasonable approximation 
to such objective rationality [Simon, 1957; 
P• 198]." 
one of the first comprehensive statements of concern about judgmental 
limitations (as juxtaposed by Slavic, 1.972). Even with a very modest 
appraisal of psychology's influence on external events, one can st.ill be 
concerned about .its contribution to a climate of opinion that values 
people increasingly less~ Or, one might just be offended by the ef-
frontery of those acaderaics who dare to r,iake such pretentious state-
ments. 
A ready retort is that the scientists' responsibility is to tell it 
like it is, giving the most accurate account possible of what the data 
seen to Si-ly, integrating them with ext1rnt theory and surrounding them 
with appropriate qualifications. On intellectual grounds, dol..ng any-
thing else voluntarily implies violating the objectivity of science; 
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doing dnything else involuntarily implies viola.ting the independence of 
science (i.e., acceding to censorship). On practical grounds, as much 
of a disservice is done to people by giving them too much credit for 
decision-making c.<1pabilities as by giving them too little. credit. In 
extreme forms, the former denies that they need help, whereas the latter 
denies that they can be helped. 
Accurate transmission of the results of research carries, however, 
no assurance of accurate reception. Listeners' desire to hear a parti-
cular story about human judgnent may he.i.ghten the normal processes by 
which scient.ific. results are misunderstood under even noncontroversia.l 
conditions. Given the stakes riding on general statements about judg-
ment, those attempting to make them have a special responsibility to 
hedge their conclusions properly. Moreover, they should monitor the way 
that those results are used, for cases where the hedges are either 
trimmed or magnified, either by those who fail to appreciate the 
niceties of experimental design or by those who choose to ignore thera) 
in order to achieve some rhetorical purpose. Ensuring a balanced sum-
mary of results may also require retelling one's tale to different 
audiences, varying the present1:1tion so as to avoid the different mis-
understandings to which it is prone. a task which is not only tedious 
but seemingly :1t odds with sd.entists' usual mission of giving just the 
Such problems are inevitable whcne.vPr there is pressure to reduce a 
complex situation to sweeping statements. Contributing to listeners' 
confusion is thf~ decide<l ambivalence of initial stud1:,nts of heuristics 
and biases~ Their enterprise wns part of the cognitive n-ivoluti.on in 
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psychology which showed, ar:tong other things, how suboptimal behavior 
that mi.ght be attributed to d11rk psychodynanic processes could also be 
accounted for by routine cognitive processes~ This reinterpretation 
rescued people from one set of charges, at the price o.t cal.ling into 
qut\Stion another set of their faculties. The heuristics perspective 
also provided a fairly pheno00.nological account of behavior, in keeping 
with the cognitive revolution's di.sentangler:.ient from behaviorism* Doing 
so ermobles people, in the sense of freeing them from the strictures of 
their environment, at the price of denying credit them for the (somewhat 
rudimentary) opttmization that tight environmental control can assure. 
Moreover, the basic heuristics-and-biases story is inherently con-
voluted, positing somewhat useful rules that can lead to predictable 
biases in well-characterized circur.1stances of indeterminate frequency. 
The listener wanting a simple message has grounds for seeing a glass 
half empty or a glass half full~ Because it is hard to say anything 
general about thtc~ prevalence of conditions in which heuristics produce 
bias, the central studies io. the area are mute regarding how "good" or 
"bad" people's judgment is~ However, given the salience of quirks, it 
is easy to see how the biases could become a figure that dwarfs the 
ground created by the heuristics in :routine (and reasonably successful) 
operation. 
"It's True But It Doesn't Matter" 
Some critics have been 1.ess timid i.n 111aking p;eneral statements 
about what li.l:01 is lik<:.', in order to be ilble to assess the impact that 
biases have on it.. Somettmcs conceding the .legitim,:1cy of the laboratory 
n!sults 1 sometimes prefacing their -work with "even j_f they are true," 
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these critics Hrgue that the biases are but epiphenomena, having little 
effect on people's lives. Although they might argue that the environ-
ment is benign, in the sense of not deliberately creating situations 
that fool people, a more common claim is that the environment is for-
giving, in the Bense of not penalizing people severely for those errors 
that they do make. 
The most sophisticated versions of these claims create error 
theories, showing the sensitivity of particular classes of decision to 
particular kinds of error. For exanple, in an analysis that originally 
focused on the effect of perceptual imperfections on motor behavior, von 
l..Jinterfeldt and Edwards (1982) showed that the expected value of many 
decisions with continuous options (e.g., invest X dollars) remains about 
the same even though people's est.i.mates of parameters in their model of 
the decision problem vary moderately. Thus, neither modest errors, nor 
modest increments in information, will demonstrably affect what they get 
out of the situation. 
Like any theoretical analysis, the power of that derived by von 
Winterfeldt and Edwards depends on the validity of its assm:1ptions and 
the breadth of its applicability. Thus, additional analyses are rn.,eded 
to assess the impact of the biases wherever there are d:Lscrete decision 
options (e.g., operate/don't operate), wherever the. magnitude of hLlS 
is beyond the (fairly broHd) rsnge .specified here, wherever multiple 
.i.nstance.s of the same modest bi.as compound within a particular deci.-
sion, wherever the bias affects aspects of decision making other than 
parameter estimation (e.g., problem structuring; von Winterh:ldt & 
Edwards, 197:'>), or wherever people choose their. options according to a. 
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decision rule other than the expectation rule specified by this model • 
.For error theories to provid~! a generic strategy for restricting 
the h1portance of biases, credible accounts are needed for the variety 
of significant decision-making situations that people fac('!, making the 
case that each kind of decision is insensitive to each kind of bias~ To 
the extent that the range of potenti.al problems can be severely con-
strained, then the general cla'i.m is strengthened~ However, 
insensitivity itself carries a price. If biases do not affect most 
decisions, then the.re will be little sharp feedback re gar.ding their 
existence, meaning that there will be little opportunity to learn to 
overcome them. As a result, one may be particularly vulnerable to their 
effects in those, perhaps few, situations in which they do matter. 
As they emerge, such analyses provide important contributions to 
understanding the relationship between people and their <"Jnvironment. 
Their rigor is in sharp contrast to vague claims to the eff.ect that 
experience would have ta1.1ght people to avoid behavior that is frequently 
bad for them. Altho1.1gh a legitimate possibility, such claims are empty 
without sped.tying the mechanism of action whereby such learning takes 
place. One ready co1.1ntercl.flim is that life fails to provide the cond.i-
tions needed for. acquiring judgment as a learned skill. Table 3 asks 
about the possibilities that even experts ht1.ve for li"arning to go beyond 
the.i.r data and r.cly on judgment. These conditions ,ctre r;ict by U.S~ 
weather forecasters making probability-of-precipi.tation forecasts 
(Murphy & Winkler, in press). At .li.ttle or no personal cost, they 
n•ceive prompt, unai::1big11ous fe.edbflck fron an institut.ion that rew.'lr<ls 
them for facing the limtts of their knowledge candidly. The resulting 
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forecasts are remarkably good (e.g., it rains 70% of the time they a.re 
70% confident that it will raLn). Whether other environments are simi-
larly cooperative for parti.cu.lar judgments is a question for 
environCJent-by-judgment analysis. How cooperative they need to be is a 
question for empirical study. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
A discouraging feature of many biases as far as possibility of 
improving judgment is that, if real) they carry the seeds of their own 
propagation by disrupting the learning process. For example, overcon-
fidence seems both to reflect and to foster relative disinterest in the 
reasons why a belief might be wrong; once undue interest in supporting 
evidence has shaped one's perceptions, there should be less perceived 
need to double c.hec.k one's beiiefs. Where such things happen, the 
chances diminish for activating another mechanism that could minimize 
the impact of biases: asking for help. Most people's lives seem to 
provide r.1any more prompts to reach for a c.a.lcu.lator or a dictionary than 
for a deci.sion aid (or aide). Whether that is, indeed, the case is 
again an empiric.al question which can be answered, in part, in the lab 
and, in part, in the marketplace (by viewi.ng the sales of different 
kinds of help)~ 
The rnnrkctp.laces for goods and ideas could, in principle, ofter 
further avenues for muting the effects of bia.s, even without awtireness 
of the need for help. For the marketplace for id<:sHs to work, there 
'Would ht1ve to be n variety of views exchanged and a tendency for less 
bl.ased ones to be mors-: persuasive, n1ther than having the concurrence of 
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faulty beliefs enhance confidence in their rectitude and swamp wiser 
alternat.ives. For the marketplace for goods to work, one would have to 
descr.ibe processes by which competitive pressures cancelled, rather than 
r:1agn.if.ied, the impact of biases, as well as prevented the exploitation 
of judgmental foibles by those with (even) less concern for people's 
welfare than the psychologists who "show them up'' .in the .laboratory. At 
the moment, such analyses are lacking. Perhaps a better hope for b.iases 
cancelling one another lies in the ambigu.ity of how the heur.istics are 
to be applied in particular situations, a top.ic considered below. 
"You (The Experimenter) Have Got It All Wrong--I'.,eople Are Doing 
Something Qui':_~ Different from What You Think and Are Doing It 
~.·· 
Describing behavior as suboptimal presumes knowledge of what is 
optimal. Within dec.ision theory, optimality is defined in terms of the 
quality of one's choices in the light of what one knows and wants. From 
this perspect.ive, it would be wrong to claim suboptimality, for example, 
when people A.Ct overconfidently in a world that rewards overconfidence, 
or when they fail to do as well as we m.ight have done g.i ven the benefit 
of our additional knowledge. When decisions are made in an unpredict-
able domain, one cannot judgE, the optimality ot a decision by the desir-
ability of the outcomte that follows. Bad outcomes ruay happen to good 
decistons, and bad decisions uw.y be followed, fortuitously, by good 
outcomes. 
Table 4 summari:>:es these and additional factors that have frus-
trated attempts to evaltuite the formal decision-mak.'ing methods used in 
corporate and governr:ient arenas~ All. have analogs in evaluating the 
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nore intuitive decision proces,;es of ind.ividuals. Consider item J., for 
example: the availabil.ity heuristic should not be unduly faulted for 
the poor results that 'Lt produces when used too casually (e.g., when an 
estimate j_s based on the first few instances or .images that come to 
iaind)--unless one feels that casualness is part and parcel of using 
heuristics (much as one might lose patience with a clinical treatment 
program whose failures were regularly explained away by the claim that 
practitioners had not applied it correctly). 3 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Critics of the heuristics research have cited 1,;ost of the factors 
in Table l as confounding .investigators' assessments of the optimali.ty 
of subjects' responses. Perhaps the most d.ifficult charges to address 
are those associated with .item 4, to wit: what constitutes a good 
outcome for subjects is not necessarily what would constitute a good 
outcome for the investigator, acting in their stead. The second of the 
six sections in Table 2 elaborates on thi.s possibility, listing ways in 
whi.c.h subject or experimenter might misunderstand one another's perspec-
tive on the task~ That ts, one might argue (a) that subjects deliber-
ately sacriticed optimality in the task (as the investigator saw it) in 
order to achieve some alternati.ve goal (e.g., learning about the system 
by making diagnostic mistakes), (b) that Rnbjec.ts share det.in.ttions of' 
key terms (e.g., probability) different from those held or presum~\d by 
the investigator, (c) that the task was :lncompletely specified until 
subjects r.1ade additional aHsumpttons that would have had to concur 
fortuitously with those made by the experimenter, or (d) thn.t subjects 
made a reasonable distinction (e.g., with regard to the relevance of 
data) to which the experimenter was insensitive. 
It is to avoid such problems that the study of decision making has 
retreated to the laboratory where, in principle, all of deta:Us can be 
specified and all extraneous beliefs or distractions c,m be eliminated. 
Thus, one can tell subjects "we really want to see how well you can 
assess the extent of your own knowledge, not how confident an impression 
you can make on the strength of that knowledge." Yet, however careful 
tnvestigators may be in designing their experim~mts to meet these 
requirements, no one conducts manipulation checks to ensure that every 
feature is understood exactly as intended--in part because of confidence 
in their ability to design experiments and divine subjects' interpreta-
tions, in part because of the. difficulty of getting at how subjects 
construe <'.l task at the moment it is performed, and in part because of 
the wilting number of possible construals that could be tested* 
Were an investgator to run all these checks, they would still be 
restricted to subjects' construal of the elements appearing in that 
investtgator' s model of optimal behavior, that is, those features that 
need to be specified in order to determine what constitutes the optimal 
decision. Thus, those working withtn the Bayesian tradition (Fisc.hhoff 
& Reyth-Marom, 1983) would have no natural interest in subjects' per-
ceptions of the. possibility for dynamic restructuring (whereby new 
evidencE> alters the set of hypotheses being (~valtwted) or in suhjects' 
second-order probabilities (i..e., the:Lr level of confidence .in their 
level of confidence), two features that are absent from the model 
(Diacon:i.s & Zabel, 1982; Gilrdenfors & Sahl.in, 1982). They may :1.Lso b<e 
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Less than eager to check on construals whose incorporation in the model 
is cun.bersorne, such as interdependence in the interpretation of data, or 
the transa(:tion costs and benefits associated with the decision-making 
process itself. 
Thus, there is a lot of room for maneuver for those who would claim 
that subjects were really up to something other than what the experi-
menters intended. The question then becomes how much credibility to 
give these claims of optimality, relative to the. claims of suboptimality 
that they are meant to counter. At the extreme, such counterclaims 
could represent no more than opportunistic special pleading, using 
whatever ad hoc reinterpretations are needed to make a point, without 
concern for the consistency of the claims made in different contexts or 
to their testability. In their dogged devotion to rational:l.ty as both a 
descriptive and prescriptive theory, economists lay themselves open to 
this trap. However, the analytical power that they derive from being 
able to use rationality in both ways means that economists have much 
more to lose by conceding some suboptimality than do psychologists, with 
their more descriptive enterprise. Indeed, one might see a case of 
throwing out the baby for the bathwater in the work of those theoreti-
cians who htwe attempted to supplcrnt time-honored r.1odels of ratI.onality 
in order to Hccount for a hiw apparently di.screpant. psyc.hologicAl 
results (e.g., Bell, 198.1; Cohen, 1981)~ 
Thc>re are three levels at whic.h one c.ould try to move countercla-Lms 
regarding what people rtn.: really do.ing in experimf~nts from the realm of 
the possiblt~ to that ot the plrtnsible. One is the suhst1.1.nt.iation of 
cliiims regarding tndividual studies, through the rletnL!.ed reading of 
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their protocols• secondary analysis of their resu1 ts, and collection of 
supporting data. The second is to demonstrate the existence and import-
ance of the psychological processes that have purportedly been ignored 
or excluded. For example, if one wished to argue that people may err 
deliberately in order to test their environnent, then one might show 
that people can learn something from such probabilistic evidence, rather 
than being misled by its feedback (e.g., Einhorn, 1978; Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1978). Finally, one can o.f.fer an alternative account for the 
entire existing body of data. Here I c.ouo.terclairns are at a disadvant-
age, insofar as theories typically deal best with data whose creation 
they prompted. However, even there, these theorieR' account .is never 
complete. They reign only so long as they do at least as well as their 
nearest competitor, mean.ing that there is room for imperfect alterna-
t.ives (Lakatos, 1970). 
"But Look At How Wel!._?eople Do Other T~ings" 
The depth and perversity of these biases seeras strikingly at odds 
with the observation that, nonetheless, the world turns, planes fly, 
meals get on the table, and games of enormous complexity (e.g., chess, 
handball) are. played. Could people be so good in one domain of comple.x 
behavior, yet so bad in the other? One answer to this question i.s that 
they couldn't, meaning that 0ne of these seem'i.ngly conflicting Dbserva-
ti.ons is incorn.'.ct. Because the Buccess<:·\S are an obvious f,'lct of 1ife, 
it then hec.or:1es n<ttural to doubt the reality of the problems* They 
coulrl be dismissed outright as laboratory curiosities (or fictions). 
Or, one could systtcmaU.c;:11 Ly increase the cre.di.bi.lity of the various 
c:ounterclaims discussed above, in order to chip away at the evidence of 
17 
apparent bias. 
A more involved response is to step up the search for hither-to-
negle.cted signs of prowess within the judgmental area i.tself, such as 
more valid entries in people's repertoire of heuristics (Nisbett, 
Krant7., Jepsen & Kunda, 1984) or ways in which a modest restructuring of 
judgmental tasks le11ds to better performance. The fifth section of 
Table 2 offers some generic forms of restructuring: (a) forcing respon-
dents to express what they know explicitly, rather than letting it 
remain "in the head;" (b) encouraging respondents to search for discre-
pant evidence, rather than collecting details corroborating a preferred 
answer; (c) offering ways to decompose an overwhelming problem into more 
tr:act1;1.ble and familiar components; (d) suggesting that respondents con-
sider the set ol:: possible situations that they might have encountered in 
order to understand better the specific situation at hand; and (e) 
proposing alternative formulations of the presented problem (e.g., using 
different. terms, concreti;,:ing, offering analogies~) 
Such restructuring presuraes no gui.Lt on the part of task or judge, 
but rather that there has been a mismatch, such that people have not 
brought their best cognitive skills to the task~ These manipulations 
could be used as ways to help people overcome the limitations revealed 
tn experiments (which would mean acknowledging their reality). Alterna-
tively, one could argue that lite itsf.clf tends to present proble"ins in a 
(restructured) way that he1ps people to use their minds to best advan-
tage. 
As with other claims to the eff,:ict that life i.s more charitable to 
pc:ople than are experimenters, these need to be buttres*;ed hy dj_rect 
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evidence or some convincing theory. One part of the ev.identiary package 
is demonstrations that such reRtructuring works. One challenge to such 
demonstrat:lons is posed by the very robustness of the biases they are 
meant to undo. In many such cases, any intervention that destabili?.es 
the dominant response patterns will tend to reduce the degree of bias, 
making confusion look like wisdom. Although confusion is oft1c,n an 
intermediate state between holding erroneous be.liefs and holding approp-
riate ones, it can also be an intermediate state between two erroneous 
beliefs. Hence, sor:ie additional evidence is needed to show that a 
reduction in bias is accompanied by an increase .in understanding. 
Some years ago, we (Fischhoff, Slovic. & Lichtenstein, 1979) be-
lieved that we had tdentified a simple form of restructuring which could 
be taught quickly and applied widely to judgmental problems. Noting 
that many biases represented the neglect of normatively important infor-
mation (e.g., that concerning base rates, sample si?.e), we thought the 
meaning of that information might be better understood if people consi-
dered how they would have responded had different vaJ.ues of it been 
reported. By and large, when subjects considered hypothetical alterna-
tive values before 1::iak:lng an inferenet~ for the "actual" set of- data, 
they showed much greater sensitivity to the commonly-neglected informa-
t.lon than had subjects who received the simple value ns one member of n 
s.ingle set of datd. Al.though some suhsidia.ry observations supported the 
interpretation that this manipulati.on ht1d tapped latent un<l(:>rstanding, 
we were disturbed that the improvement fro1n it fatled to general:L?.e. In 
a Hubsequent study (Fischhoff- & Bar-Hillel, 198/+b), we found that. the 
sane nanipulation was equally effective i.n scnsitiz.i:ng suhjccts to other 
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kinds of information that had been ignored appropriately in previous 
studies. Conceivably, the manipulation tapped some latent misunder-
standing in these cases. However, a more parsimonious account is that 
it just shakes up the normal response patterns, which does l'ittle good 
unless accompanied by some substantive training in how to interpret data 
more adequately. 
Facing the Biases 
A final possibility is to abandon the search for a simple solution 
and look for an account that incorporates the ker-nels of truth in the 
original clai.ms regarding biases, as well as the counterclaims and 
counter-counterclaims that they have generated. Acknowledging the co-
existence of superlative performance in some areas, alongside deficits 
in others, opens a number of productive avenues. The first of these is 
reconciling the disparity. Just why is it that people are so good at 
some things and so bad at others? The set of possible reasons can be 
partitioned (along the .lines of Table 2) into factors involving the 
tasks (and the environment in which they must be performe<l), factors 
involving the psychological capabilities that people bring to them, and 
factors involving the interaction between people and tasks. 
The gist of the ambient account among n:searc.her.o, in the heuriH-
tics-and-biases tradition is that there are no fundmllental psychological 
limitations, beyond information-processing capacity, that prevent people 
J:rorn acquiring the ski.llB nee.ided to make better judgments. Nonetheless, 
there are powerful environmental barrier» to acquisition~ One is the 
absence of systematic tra.i.ning in judgment or decision nnking in nost 
.i ur:f.sdict ions ( Beyth-Marom, Dekel ~ Combo & Shak.ed, l 985). This defici-
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ency would not be so serious were people I s natural environment more 
forthcoming with opportunities for learniGg. However, as suggested 
above in the context of experts (Table J), people seldom receive the 
orderly feedback needed to improve their judgment and decision making. 
In this regard, those are skills quite different than, for exaqple, 
problem solving, where rJ.ght aud wrong answers are readily identified. 
Finally• there are barriers posed by the interaction between psycholog-
ical processes and the environment. Fallible heuristics nay survive 
because they generally have enough ecological. validity to avoid the sort 
of egregious errors needed to get people even to think seriously about 
changing their ways (especially when they do not know where to look for 
help). Fallible heuristics may generate self-fulfilling prophecies when 
they prompt actions that serve to justify their predictions (Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1978). And, they may be rewarded socially when they represent 
widely accepted patterns of judgme.nt. From this general perspective, 
general statements about the prevalence nnd potency of bias are meaning-
less. However, there are strong pressures ensuring that they will arise 
(predictably, in certain situations) and that when they do their effects 
can be serious. 
Although fairly controversial, this account of the place of bias in 
people's lives is still quite general, and certainly not the only one 
possible. Refini.ng (or replacing) it will require 11 detail.e.rl, and 
potentially productive, analysis of the ecology of infere.nce, consider-
ing the structure of tasks, the efficacy of heurtstics, Hnd the oppor-
tunities for learning. Given the precision and richness of the norma-
tivE.~ mode.ls for judgment and decision r.u1.king, this area may offer par ti.-
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cu.lar promise for insightful theori:r.ing. The error theories cited above 
are steps in this direction. 
Taking the bL1ses seriously, where they appear, is also a pre con-
dition for doing something serious about alleviating them. The m.iddle 
sections of Table 2 describe ways of addressing the possibility that 
people have real problems, in this circumscribed domain. Optimistical-
ly, one could train them. The table de.scribes an escalation design 
going through: mere warning about the possibility of bias without 
specifying its nature, 4 describing the direction (and perhaps extent) of 
the bias that is typically observed, providing a dose of feedback, 
personali,,:ing the implications of the warning, and offering an extended 
prograr.1 of training with feedback, coaching, and whatever else it takes 
to afford the r.espondent cognitive mastery of the task. The restruc-
turing procedures of section 5 could be part of "whatever else it 
takes." Empirical evidence suggests that training does work, particu-
larly when it is informed by the sort of psycho.logical understanding 
about how people think (and how they might be helped to think better) 
that restructuring implies (Fischhoft, 1982a). 
Where optimism is not rewarded, or the steps needed to achieve 
improvement cannot be afforded, it may be advisah.lE) to give up on 
people. One possibility ts replacing people with some s11p12.rior proce-
dure, such as the use of regression models of c.U.nieal judgment. (e.g., 
Dawt:s, 1979) •. A second i.s recalibrating fallible judgments to more 
appropriate values, assuming that the ai:1.ount and direct:lon of errors are 
predictable~ For example, the (UK) Central Ele.c.tri.city Generating Board 
was better able to forecast power availability when J.t doubled .its 
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engineers' chronica.l.ly understated estimates of the time needed to return 
units to production (Kidd• 1970). A third possibility is acknowledging 
the imprecision in people's judgments when planning actions based on 
them, by being ready for surprises and open to alternative views. 
Taking heuristics and biases seriously allows 1.md forces one to 
expect more from them, such as precise predictions regarding when and 
how heuristics will be used. Many of the original demonstrations were 
tours de force, in which few observers would deny• say, that 
availability was the heuristic of choice and that it would be employed 
in a particular way. In other cases, though, several different 
heuristics might be used, each in several different ways (e.g~, 
Fischhoff, 1975, pp. 297-8)4 For exai:iple, the relative availability of 
examples from competing categories might be quite different after a 
short search than after a long one, producing quite different estimates 
(Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1977). With specification left so vague, the 
possibilities for interpretative ad hoc·-ery could eventually rival those 
that frustrate attempts to test rationality as a descriptive ,aodel of 
human decision mald.ng. Short of, or as a step toward, a full-blown 
theory of heuristics application, one could develop procedures for 
asses1,tng their usage in particular settings, as a basis for gencrat.ing 
testable prcdi(:tions for the Hummary judg\-:icnts that should emerge 
(Fischhoft, 1983; Fischhoff & Bar-Hille 1, 1984a). 
Finally, taking the binses seriously should prompt serious ques-
tions regarding the nature of a. f:ull-fJ.edged theory of heuristics. 
Currently, "heuristics ,:~nd biases" is a broad m1brella for a diverse set 
of proc0<lures whose common thread is the domain of tasks that evoke 
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them, rather than some fundamental underlying cognitive processes. The 
futun? could be the integration of these pieces into a comprehensive 
theory describing the :11.location and direction of heuristics in differ-
ent circur:istances. Or, i.t could be the development of local theories, 
describing the cognitive processes evoked when there is recourse to 
heuristics. An adjunct to either. kind of heuristics theory t,wuld be ao 
account of what happens when people reject even these somewhat rudi-
nentary procedures for dealing with uncertainty analytically. That is• 
what happens when people choose not to think their way through to a 
solution, drawing .i.n.ferences through synthesis of available facts--but, 
rather, try to match new situations to old ones in order to find some 
habit, tradition, or other rule of thur.ib that will guide their behavior. 
, . 
Such a nelange of principles and procedures at different levels may 
not be the kind of theory of judgment that we want. However, it may be 
the kind of account that is needed to treat the diverse ways that people 
cope wi.th uncertainty. 
Footuotes 
1. In order to focus attention on issues, rather than personali-
ties, these themes are discussed in generic terms rather than as posi-
tions offered by particular critics~ Doing so also allows me to present 
a set of integrated alternatives, some of which have yet to be advanced, 
and to avoid attributing particular themes (or hybrids) to individual 
authors. Some points of access to the criticA-1 literature are Berkeley 
and Humphreys (1982), Cohen (1981, and commentary), Edwards (1982), 
Fischhoff (1982a,b; 1983), Hogarth (1981), Jungerruann (1984), Kahneman 
and Tversky (1982a), Nisbett & Ross (1980), Phillips (1982). 
2. For example, the theoretically proper procedure for motivating 
people to express their confidence in their own knowledge is the use of 
proper ~1!;:pring_ rules (see Lichtenstein, Fischhoff & Phillips, 1982, for 
an elementary exposition and references to more technical ones).. These 
take the form of algebraic rules that provide users with the highest 
expected value if they reveal their true beliefs. Unfortunately, it is 
not clear that people always accept the appeal of the expected value 
rule or can execute it if they try in such novel circumstances 
(:!?ischl10ff, Goitein, & Shapira, 1982). What they do seem to learn from 
trial-anQ(':;error experience with the ru1e is that the rewards for 
expressing great confidence, while there, are pretty meager. As a 
result, only those determined to squee?e the last 2xpected point out of 
the scoring rule will ever do so. By reducing confidence, the rule HJ.so 
reduces overconfidence, the most common result in such experiments. 
However, it is hard to argue that the sharpened incentives have producPd 
sharpened self-understanding, rather than an artif'actuA.1 adjustment. 
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J. Indeed, Table 4 was de.rived trorn consideriog the analogies 
between decision aiding and that other helping profession, psychotherapy 
(Fischhoff, 1980). In general, the standards of evidence demanded by 
clinicians seems to stack up quite well against those of the consultants 
selling decision-aiding services. 
4~ This strategy differs from inspiring people to work harder by 
implying that the potential error is systematic and that respondents 
need instruction, not just a fair chance~ 
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Tab.le 1 
Heuristics and Biases 
Heuristic 
.Availability: estil'.late 
the frequency of events by 
the ease with which in-
stances are remembered; 
assess the likelihood by the 
ease with which it is 
imagined. 
Representativenes~: assess 
the probability of an event 
by how well it represents 
salient features of the 
data-generating process. 
Anchoring: estimate 
numer.ical quantiti<2s by 
making c1. best guess and 
then adjusting in response 
to additional considera-
tions. 
Hindsight: make sense 
of outcome reports, inte-
grat.ing them with previous 
knowledge about event. 
Belief confirmation: 
look fo·r reas'OOs sup-
porting one's beliefs. 
Bias 
ovc.rest.imation of 
unduly memorable or 
salient events 





Tversky & Kahne.man 
(1973), Kahneman & 
Tversky (1982b), 
Taylor (1982). 
Kahneman & Tversky 
( 1972), Bar-Hillel 
( 1980) , Fischho.ff & 
Bar-Hillel (1984a). 
undue influence of Tversky & Kalmeman 
anchor; vulnerability (1974). 
to irrelevant anchors~ 
inability to recon-
struct previous state 
of mind; unduly harsh 
judgments of decisions 
made :ln foresight. 
exaggerat.ing extent 
of own knowledge~ 
Fischhoff (1975, 
1982a), Slavic & 
Fischhoff ( 1977). 
Fischhoff, Slovic 
& Lichtenstein (1977), 
Koriat, Lichtenstein & 
Fischhoff (1980). 
Tab.le 2 








Mismatch between judg~ and task 
Restructuring 
Educatj_on 





Use better response modes 
Ask fewer questtons 
Demonstrate alternative goal 
Demonstrate se1;iantic disagreement 
Demonstrate impossibility of task 
Der.1onstrate overlooked distinction 
Warn of problem 
Describe problem 
Provide personali?.ed feedback 
Train extens.ively 
Replace them 
Recalibrate their responses 
Plan on error 
Hake knowledge explicit 
Search for discrepant information 
Decompose problen 
Consider alternative situations 
Offer alternative formulati..ons 
Rely on substantive experts 
Educate. from childhood 
Table 3 
Cond.itions for Improving judg1;ient 
Do Experts Have Them'? 
J.. Abundant practice with a set of reasonably homogeneous tasks. 
Experts should have such experience. They may use it to hone their 
judgmental skills or they may develop situation-sped.fie habitual 
solutions, freeing themselves .from the need to analyze (and think). 
2. Clear-cut criterion events. Although experts are often required to 
make their judgments quite explicit, the objects of those judgments 
are often components of such complex (natural, sod.al, or biologi-
cal) systems that it is hard to evaluate the judge's level of 
understanding. Off-target judgments may be due to unanticipated 
contingencies, whereas on-target judgments may have been right for 
the wrong reason. 
3. Task-specific reinforcement. Experts are, in principle, paJ.d for 
performance. However, even when the wisdom of their judgments can 
be discerned, they rnay be rewarded on other grounds (e.g., did they 
bring good news? did they disrupt plans? did things turn out for 
the best?). 
4. Explicit admission of the need for learning. Entering an appren-
ticeship program that confers expertise is surely a sign of modes-
ty. Nonetheless, at every stage of that process and the profes-
sional life that follows it, certain advantages accrue to those who 
put on a good show and exude competence. 
Table 4. l<:ffec.ts that Complicate Attempts to Evaluate the Efficacy of n. 
Decision-Making Hethod 
1. The fac.t that practitioners 4. 
have been trained in a method 
In some cases, defining a "good 
outcome" is far from a trival 
matter - for example, when one 




and claim to be carrying it 
out is no guarantt:e that they 
are. Assessing fide.l.ity of 
implementation is crucial for 
knowing what is being evalu- 5. 
ated. 
The apparent success of some 
methods may be attcibutable less 
to their substance than to the 
A well-designed method may 
fail because of unanticipated 
and uncontrollable changes in 
the world. Thus "good method" 
does not necessarily imply 
"good outcome." 
Sometimes dee.is.ion-making 
methods look good because 
they were fortunate enough to 
be used at t.imes when they 
could not fail. Almost every-
body and every method made 
money in the stock market of 
the 1950s and early 1960s. 
Thus "good outcome" does not 
necessarily imply "good 
method." 




include reduced anxiety, in-
creased self-confidence. and 
heightened attention to the 
problem. 
6~ Anecdotal evaluations are often 
skewed by tendencies to be in-
fluenced by professional folk-
lore and to interpret random 
fluctuations as consistent pat-
terns. 
7. An evaluation can be distorted 
by looking only for the positive 
effects a method produces and 
ignoring possible negative ef-
fects - or by looking only for 
the negative effects .. 
Source: Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Slavic, Derby & Keeney (1981). 
